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______________________________________________________ 
The ideology of the liberal peace has propelled the political economies of war-torn 
societies into a scheme of global convergence towards “market liberalisation”. This 
orthodoxy was an uncontestable assumption underlying external economic assistance. 
However, the project faltered under its inherent contradictions and because it ignored 
the socio-economic problems confronting war-torn societies, even aggravating them 
by increasing the vulnerability of populations to poverty and shadow economic 
activity. Although revisionists have embarked on a mission to boost the UN’s 
peacebuilding capacity and also rescue the Millennium Development Goals, the basic 
assumptions of the liberal peace are not challenged and potential alternatives are 
overlooked.  
        _______________________________________________________ 
 
How far are external agencies dictating the pattern of economic transformation in 
societies emerging from conflict? From current practice in a variety of situations, and 
from proposed reforms to peacebuilding and development, the answer seems to be: 
“as far as the eye can see!” The hubris of peacebuilders keys the political economy of 
war-torn societies into a map captioned “the liberal peace project” that, in its 
economic dimension, requires convergence towards “market liberalisation.” This 
became an aggressively promoted orthodoxy, with variations, derived from the late 
1990s Washington consensus on the logically correct path of development for 
undeveloped states. Perhaps not treated as a high priority in stabilising peace per se 
(the vanguard of which has been allocated to fostering security, rule of law and 
democratic forms), neoliberal economic policies were nevertheless barely-contested 
assumptions underlying external economic reconstruction assistance and management 
in war-torn societies.  
This article interrogates the current, and proposed revisions of, political 
economy as it affects peacebuilding from a critical theory perspective in international 
relations. This perspective concerns the power of post-industrial capitalism and the 
agency behind globalisation ideology.  Certainly, there is considerable disagreement 
among critical authors about the ontology of so-called market democracy, the power 
of its non-state networks and agencies vis-à-vis states and about the pre-eminence of a 
fundamentalist version of neoliberalism (its passing having been identified by John 
Ralston Saul, 2005). Theorists from rather disparate standpoints who have grappled 
with the problematique of global capitalism include (Cox, 2002; Van der Pijl, 1998; 
Baumann, 2000; Murphy, 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2000). They have in common, 
however, a concern to construct an inclusive and emancipatory concept of political 
economy, an approach that can also be applied to peacebuilding.  
In applying a critical approach, this analysis focuses on the politics of the 
economic projects within the liberal peace framework, drawing examples from south-
east Europe. First, it deals with the orthodox rationale of the political economy of 
peacebuilding. Next, the article notes the virtual death of the Washington consensus 
and identifies a millennial revisionist agenda that emerged internationally during the 
course of 2004–05. This interrogation, then, allows reflection about the objectification 
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of war-torn societies, and on the essentialist rationale of the political economy of 
peacebuilding and its dysfunctional and normative/ethical contradictions. The article 
contends that, although the depiction of an aggressive, undifferentiated liberal 
peacebuilding has been refined, the millennial revisionist project ultimately fails to 
address these contradictions. An inclusive/emancipatory participation of local actors 
and structural diversity in political economies indicates alternative options to the 
revisionist ideology that is embedded in a liberal structuring of global political 
economy.  
 
The Economic Peacebuilding Rationale 
 
The rationale for determining rules and frameworks for the development of societies 
that will release them from so-called “conflict traps” (Collier et al., 2003), attributes 
economic dysfunctionalism to societies, in their pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict 
stages, rather than to any dysfunctional economic precepts, structures and 
conditionalities generated by expressions of capitalist power and “global 
governance,”(1). A key aspect of the ‘liberal peace’ thus promotes a form of 
economic control and regulation to establish market correctives in societies that have 
been resistant to conventional marketisation imperatives (Paris, 1997; Duffield, 2001; 
Richmond, 2005).  
Although its modern version derives from the 1989 Washington consensus, to 
which Kofi Annan subsequently acceded on behalf of the United Nations, the project 
has not been revolutionary. Its antecedents can be traced to Cobdenite teachings 
concerning the peaceful benefits of free trade, though it was not so much ‘free’ as 
imposed by the hegemon, the UK and its powerful navy. Nevertheless, the ideology 
survived the First World War, and only in the Second did it give way to a system of 
international management on Keynesian lines. Even so, poverty reduction was 
conceived as serving the security interests of the most powerful. Robert McNamara’s 
“war on poverty” at the World Bank in 1972 was driven by the notion that the poor 
went communist (George, 1994: 48-57). Subsequent pressure on the US dollar in the 
Vietnam war and the collapse of trade proposals in the New International Economic 
Order, that would have assisted the poor countries, cemented the rise of neoliberalism. 
In historical terms, then, one can legitimately argue that the liberal peace has been a 
fluid response to the logic of industrial and post-industrial capitalism (Murphy, 2005: 
142). 
In its most modern manifestation, the liberal project has gained enormous 
strength, less perhaps from the economics of profiteering and driving down costs of 
production, than from the rationale of globalisation. The future vision has been 
constructed as economics without borders. State and international regulation should 
survive mainly to preserve fair competition and guard against fraudulence or the worst 
excesses of environmental degradation – less to ensure that people make a living. The 
liberal peace has promoted transformation through macro-economic stability, 
reduction of the role of the state, the squeezing of collective and public space, a quest 
for private affluence, and a reliance on privatisation and on exports and foreign 
investment to stimulate economic growth. Concerns about large, often corrupt and 
wasteful, state-run infrastructure projects in developing countries, may also have had 
an affect on donor policy. For instance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) did not fund state infrastructure reconstruction in Bosnia 
(EBRD: 1997), though when normal commercial circumstances apply, these concerns 
are generally brushed aside. Nevertheless, the “small state” rationale appears to have 
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worked for the wealthiest post-industrial societies, and so it must also work for the 
poorest and most disrupted. Indeed, the US State Department’s Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization has a mission to help post-conflict societies to install 
market economies (Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilisation, 
2004). 
However, there is plentiful evidence that choices made for war-torn societies are 
serve to maintain wealth imbalances and poorly implemented. The liberal project not 
only ignores the socio-economic problems confronting war-torn societies, it 
aggravates the vulnerability of sectors of populations to poverty and does little either 
to alleviate people’s engagement in shadow economies or to give them a say in 
economic reconstruction. As Balakrishnan Rajagopal contends, development 
interventions have been socially costly and divisive, with: 
 
forced privatization of key national industries and increased 
unemployment, speculative bubbles in international finance transactions 
that have massive impact on real estate and housing markets, 
displacements of vast populations, great waves of migrations including to 
urban areas, elimination of subsidies for food and services and the 
introduction of user fees (Rajagopal, forthcoming 2006). 
 
War results in destabilising changes in employment, production and “[t]he ensuing 
collapse of market entitlements for large groups of people makes it highly dangerous 
to rely exclusively on the market to allocate resources, set prices and fix factor 
incomes” (Nafziger, 1996:16). Prices alone cannot correct injustice. 
 Together with the interim Iraq constitution perhaps the most striking example 
of external imposition has been in Kosovo, in spite of its status as a province of Serbia 
in the state of Serbia–Montenegro. Although varying in their degrees of enforcement 
and consensus, both Iraq and Kosovo have experienced top-down, military-backed 
impositions. External actors determined Kosovo’s framework constitution, its 
international status and its official economic development. Indeed, NATO came 
armed with an economic vision that its most powerful members had already inserted 
into the Rambouillet ultimatum of 23 February 1999 before the war. This diktat stated 
that “the economy of Kosovo shall function in accordance with free market 
principles,” and became integral to the NATO war aim of securing the territory from 
Serb authority Interim Agreement. Article II specified the reallocation of ownership 
and resources of government-owned assets, pensions and social insurance, revenues 
and any other matters relating to economic relations (Interim Agreement for Peace 
and Self-Government in Kosovo, 1999). The economic principles were only sketched 
out at Rambouillet, but it was assumed that they were valid and should be imposed. 
Security Council resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 was less presumptuous, but 
supported economic development through the Balkan Stability Pact, which in turn 
specified free market economies throughout the region of south-east Europe. In 
contradiction to numerous declarations that Kosovo was to be governed in accordance 
with democratic principles, economic policy has been determined by the European 
Union (EU), the international financial institutions and national aid agencies. Under 
the constitutional framework, the peoples of Kosovo are entitled to protect their 
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identities, and to be free from economic 
discrimination, but not to determine their economic future if they want reconstruction 
aid (Pugh, 2006).  
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Virtual Death of the Neoliberal Consensus 
 
Critical analysis of the links between neoliberalism and unrest (Chua, 2004) and the 
construction of lessons to be learned from the failures of economic transformation in 
general and in conflict areas such as Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq in 
particular, has led to reassessments of the liberal peace. Resistance to the power of 
neoliberalism as a framework for sustainable development and peacebuilding have 
also apparently been influential. These include in the present case: pressures for ‘fair 
trade’, fulfilment of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), debt reduction, 
demands for social protection for the poor and abandonment of aid conditionality. 
This has a historical provenance in the agency of system building noted by Craig 
Murphy, many of the ideas for moving capitalism onwards have originated with the 
various resistances to the impacts of global capital (Murphy, 2005: 51-53). 
Such pressures have also affected the introduction of development policies in war-
torn societies under the aegis of peacebuilding. Preliminary work by Oliver Richmond 
provides a nuanced typology of liberal peace that disaggregates it into several modes 
(Richmond, 2005). At one extreme a non-consensual, hyper-conservative model 
attempts to maintain peace through military superiority. At the other extreme an 
emancipatory model combines top-down and bottom-up peacebuilding, focuses on a 
range of actors and emphasizes social justice. In between, conservative models have 
been attempted in Kosovo and East Timor respectively.  
In practice, in spite of the economic diktat of Kosovo’s constitution, for 
example, neoliberalism was modified in Kosovo, in the light of experience in Bosnia. 
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) learned the necessity of tackling 
shadow economies from experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where anti-crime 
measures and institutions had been established slowly. UNMIK Customs was the first 
public body to be set up, and together with EU Customs Assistance Mission reformed 
the collection system, tripling revenues between 1999 and 2003 (Caplan, 2004). The 
neoliberal credo of Rambouillet and the constitutional framework has been tempered 
in rhetoric and practice by programmes of social protection. Thus the EU’s 2002 
Action Programme gave priority to the delivery of public services, institution 
building, public administration and socially-oriented projects (European Agency for 
Reconstruction, 2003). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
emphasized employment generation through training programmes and social justice 
projects for ending ethnic and gender discrimination (UNDPa, 2003). The World 
Bank provided significant sums for social and public welfare and for poverty 
reduction through a Trust Fund, and its Bank’s Post-conflict Reconstruction Unit has 
produced pro-poor diagnostics and appears to accept that a linear model of transition 
is generally unviable (World Bank, 1998 and 2002). Together with the UNDP, the 
Bank also supported community initiatives for infrastructure rehabilitation and 
attempted to strengthen the income generation capacity of vulnerable rural families. 
Even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed reform to facilitate long-term 
planning and stressed the need for investment in education, health and social policy 
(IMF, 2003). In Kosovo, therefore, several partners in economic restructuring have 
acknowledged the importance of social justice, and have undertaken investment in 
poverty reduction and public services.  
Even here, however, in spite of slackening growth, rising unemployment and 
falling purchasing power in 2002–03, the IMF welcomed curbs on spending and 
advised further controls on wages, social welfare, public sector employment and 
compensation for workers thrown out of work by privatization (IMF, 2003). Deficit 
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financing was not part of its lexicon, even in conditions of social distress. In the last 
quarter of 2001, an estimated 50 per cent of the population lived in poverty and 12 per 
cent in extreme poverty (USAID, 2001). In the first quarter of 2003 the 
unemployment rate was estimated at between 49 and 57 per cent (70 per cent among 
16-24 year olds); about 25 per cent of the labour force was registered as job seekers 
UNDP, 2001; UNDP, 2003b: 11, tab 2.1). Not surprisingly, opinion surveys ranked 
unemployment and poverty among the greatest problems facing Kosovo (UNDP, 
2003b: 31, tabA10). These were not, however, the top priorities of the external 
agencies. 
Debates on peacebuilding have paralleled debates on development. As Murphy 
argues, the development project has been essential to capitalism for its promise of 
global stability (Murphy, 2005: 97). Weak states and weak development have not only 
been held up as catalysts of conflict; war has also had devastating impacts on 
development. War-torn societies have thus tended to be treated as particular, and 
sometimes acute, cases of under- or disrupted development.  
The debate on development in general has evolved to the point that the 
Washington consensus has been declared “dead” except as an inaccurate term of 
abuse (Maxwell, 2005; Ritzen, 2005). Certainly, the neoliberal agenda is now 
contested more seriously than in the 1990s, so that it has ceased to be an unquestioned 
“common sense”, ideology or doxa. Revisionists in the mainstream of international 
thought have recognised the chill of failure evident in neoliberalism – though without 
challenging the fundamentals of an ideology that, in the words of Günter Grass, “sees 
mankind as nothing more than something which consumes and produces” (Grass, 
2005: 5).  
A salient example was the report by an International Commission on the 
Balkans, chaired by former Italian Prime Minister, Giuliano Amato, and comprised 
almost entirely of serving and former politicians of impeccably conservative and 
(apparently) masculine credentials (only two of the 18 were women), smart suited in 
the group photograph and presenting an appearance of conventional authority 
(International Commission on the Balkans, 2005). In spite of the huge scale and 
intrusive scope of international intervention in Southeast Europe, the Commission 
announced that the returns had been meagre and that the region was becoming a 
marginalised black hole. This remarkable document reiterated points made by 
individuals such as General Fabio Mini commander of UNMIK (who categorically 
announced after the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in March 1994, that the mission had 
failed) and of critical think tanks, such as Human Rights Watch (Human Rights 
Watch, 2004: 3; Mini, 2005). According to Human Rights Watch, “The international 
community appears to be in absolute denial about its own failings in Kosovo. While 
international actors have been universally – and accurately – critical of the failures of 
the Kosovo Albanian leadership during and after the crisis, the dismal performance of 
the international community has escaped similar critical scrutiny.” But the Amato 
report’s provenance among interested political leaders served to undermine the many 
scripts by international interventionist that claimed they were achieving success. The 
Commission on the Balkans concluded that the alternatives for the region were either 
integration with Europe or an even more exacting neo-colonialism, the two being 
regarded in this exercise as antithetical. The Commission argued that EU expansion to 
the region would solve its problems – a widely-supported solution even by critics of 
external intervention (Steil and Woodward, 1999).  
But recognition that protectorate power and weak economies in southeast 
Europe were marks of failure did not mean that the ideological goals, or the 
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fundamental principles for generating homo economicus, were flawed. Rather, the 
process for getting there was all wrong. Integration with the EU and new political 
perspectives (Kosovo’s independence, for example), were required. In effect, the 
Balkan Commission’s report not only treated the region as a referent, and threatening, 
object, for which “Balkan” was the operative signifier of fragmented chaos, it relied 
heavily on a “common-sense” renewal of economic neoliberalism through European 
integration. Indeed the evolving debate marks out dynamics in the liberal peace 
project that protect and reproduce its core assumptions. The old-style unthinking 
Washington consensus about development may be merely a virtual death, with a 
liberal peace redivivus emerging from the ashes. Moreover, the linkage between post-
conflict reconstruction, development and human security has been made explicit in a 
series of reports that appear to be setting the framework for pro-poor debates in mid-
decade. 
 
Millennial Revisionism: a New York Consensus? 
 
One of the most prominent, and influential, revisionist programmes has come from 
the Millennium Project Report to the UN Secretary-General, Investing in 
Development, released in February 2005. Indeed the Millennium Project analysis 
provided the nucleus of the first half of the UN Secretary-General’s subsequent UN 
reform programme. (United Nations, 2005). The Millennium Project was conducted 
by economists headed by Jeffrey D. Sachs of Columbia University. A special adviser 
to Kofi Annan, he had been a chief architect of structural adjustment and a proponent 
of  “short sharp shock treatment”, which had devastating consequences for vulnerable 
sectors of society in the Russian Federation. Sachs, however, is one in a line of 
economists who have experienced a Damascene conversion. George Soros and Joseph 
Stiglitz have been there before (Soros, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002).   
Punctuated by such stirring phrases as “scaling-up success”, Investing in 
Development was remarkable for its commitment to pro-poor and social protection 
economics. Its springboard was the measurement of uneven and halting progress 
towards the achievement of the MDGs by the target date of 2015. These include: 
 
● reduction of extreme poverty and hunger by 50% 
● universal primary education 
● equal primary and secondary enrolment for girls; literacy parity for men and 
women; equal representation of women in parliaments 
● a two-thirds reduction in mortality among the under fives 
● measles immunization 
● a 75% reduction in maternal mortality 
● a halt to and reversal of the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis  
● a 50% reduction in those without improved drinking water and sanitation 
● improvement in the lives of slum dwellers 
● reversal of deforestation 
 
The Sachs team’s review showed that by 2004 many of the goals were nowhere 
near being achieved, and were even further away from the benchmarks in some cases, 
tuberculosis in sub-Saharan Africa having increased, for example. Investing in 
Development acknowledged that the shock of market therapy would not work for 
Africa, and recommended a bold revision of international strategy. Its key 
components were: 
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● developing countries should adopt MDG-based, poverty-reduction strategies, to be 
in place by 2006; 
● MDG strategies should anchor the scaling up of public investment, capacity 
building, resource mobilization and development assistance, to strengthen 
governance, human rights, civil society and promote the private sector; 
● strategies should be transparent and inclusive; 
● donors should fast-track a dozen or more countries to scale-up good governance; 
● partners should launch Quick Win actions for economic growth (such as the 
distribution of anti-mosquito nets); 
● developing countries should align national strategies with regional initiatives such 
as New Partnership for Africa’s Development and the Caribbean Community; 
● Overseas Development Aid should increase – from 0.25% of GNP in 2003 to 0.44% 
in 2006 and 0.7% in 2015, with improved quality of aid, and more generous debt 
relief; 
● high-income countries should open their markets to developing country exports and 
raise their export competitiveness through investment; 
● scientific research should be mobilized to address the needs of the poor; 
● the UN should be strengthened at various levels to support the MDGs 
 
There seems little doubt that such a programme has considerable appeal because 
it is a significant step towards managing the crisis of capitalism in a way that benefits 
the poor and vulnerable populations of the world. Massive reduction in the number of 
deaths from structural violence (though the report never uses that term) can only 
please supporters of pro-poor causes, from debt relief to the provision of cheap, life-
saving drugs to human security ideals. Nevertheless, embedded in the text of Investing 
in Development are assumptions that, taken as a whole, indicate that the liberal peace 
project is alive and well, even if the Washington consensus itself is moribund. The 
main features of what might be called Sachs 2 can be summarized as follows: 
 
● its consumerist teleology frames the problem of development in terms of  
convergence and integration into the world trading system; 
● entrepreneurial zeal is what drives human beings: homo economicus is reified 
without taking into account the human values outlined in the “Millennium 
Declaration” of the General Assembly (UN General Assembly, 2000);  
● there is a common solution: “Whatever one’s motivation for attacking the crisis of 
extreme poverty… the solutions are the same. All that is needed is action” 
(Millennium Project, 2005: 1); 
● responsibility for failures – corruption and bad governance, for example – lie with 
“them” and the poor need to be changed because they deplete the environment, for 
example;  
● “sound economic policy” is a matter of rationality; rational economic management 
works; 
● public investment should be used to establish market reforms: in other words, 
public funds for private enterprise; 
● the MDGs can be met without dirigisme in politics and state command over the 
economy; 
● progress can be achieved through Quick Win fixes. 
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The merger of development and peacebuilding had already been made explicit 
in the High-level Panel Report (HLP), A More Secure World: Our Responsibility 
which also carried the burden, and sway, of UN’s sponsorship (HLP, 2004). The UN 
Secretary-General’s reform programme of 2005, In Larger Freedom, was largely a 
composite of the Sachs team’s review, Investing in Development, and the HLP 
Report. Development and peacebuilding revisionism can be said to have staked a 
claim in the UN Secretariat as the foundation for the developmental dynamic in 
human security, and Sachs 2 seems to be supported by various other countries. 
Among member states, the UK’s pro-poor document, Fighting poverty to build a 
safer world, produced by DFID, also merges security, development, crime, terrorism 
and economic growth. The UK government also supports in general terms the UN 
Secretary-General’s reform programme and specifically encourages the international 
financial institutions to engage in security issues, so that the IMF for example 
incorporates conflict analysis into Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance agreements 
(Department for International Development, 2005: 22). The DFID document 
conforms to the Sachsian line in several respects: that crime hinders growth, foreign 
direct investment is the engine of growth, and problems are significantly rooted in 
issues of governance as well as poverty. 
The High-level Panel and the Secretary-General placed great store by the 
establishment of a voluntary standing fund of US$250 million for peacebuilding and 
the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission and a UN Peacebuilding Support Office. 
They also recommended the involvement of economic agencies such as the World 
Bank at an early stage in peace processes. In principle, this could present an 
opportunity to institutionalise lessons learned from past experiences in the 
transformation of political economies from war to peace. However, the new structure 
will be answerable to the Security Council, where the power lies, rather than to the 
Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. Moreover, without 
wholesale change to the policies and programmes of the IFIs, the participation of 
international economic institutions in peace processes will likely reinforce aspects of 
the liberal peace. 
Furthermore, in the light of disagreements at the September 2005 UN summit, 
it is unlikely that the revisionist programme or a variant will forge a broad “New York 
consensus”. In particular, the project was jeopardised by the Bush Administration’s 
determination to contest the summit agenda, as antithetical to US foreign policy, to 
the point that mention of the MDGs was eliminated from the summit declaration, 
thereby downgrading the revisionist programme to a contested aspiration (Borger, 
2005a, 2005b).  
 
 
Protecting the Liberal Peace 
 
This analysis now draws out some of the underlying assumptions of revisionism from 
a critical perspective under five heads: the silence surrounding of structural violence, 
economics as natural law, the objectification of war-torn societies, squeezing public 
goods and global integration. 
 
The Silence Surrounding Structural Violence 
First, the hubris that pervades the revisionist view is part of a familiar critique of weak 
regulation, such as that in Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier, et al., 2003). The 
Collier critique calls for tough controls, regulation and monitoring of parties in zones 
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of conflict and an end to “bad governance” by corrupt, undemocratic elites in 
developing countries. Malfeasance, abuse, torture and even genocidal operations are 
certainly conducted by elites, rebels and followers against fellow inhabitants in the 
South. Most casualties are perpetrated by governments against citizens; and there is 
an ethical imperative to prevent this. Setting ethical standards for state behaviour and 
intervention are, to be sure, exceptionally difficult to establish without reinforcing the 
hubris of powerful states. Although this is not the focus of this essay, from a critical 
theory, and particularly a Habermasian, perspective, a key to the problem of such 
universal discourses lies in dialogue with local civil societies.[addition]  
But the millennial critique has also consistently maintained a silence around 
structural victimization and policies that have emanated from the zones of peace and 
probity (and the financial agencies that they dominate). The asymmetry of external 
pressure on state-welfare economies, protected economies, co-operative organisation 
and collective production denies communities economic options and can produce a 
politics of victimhood that stratifies and emnifies others, as occurred in Rwanda (Azar 
and Farah, 1981; Nafziger and Auvinen, 2003; Uvin, 1998).  
The divide between rich and poor is, by definition, the precondition for having 
MDGs in the first place, but the Collier team’s agenda for international action 
contains one paragraph of barely ten lines recommending a re-examination of the 
development and trade policies of the Organisation for Economic Development and 
the removal of subsidies to its producers and traders (Collier et al., 2003: 181).  
 In similar vein Investing in Development contains a single bullet point that 
fires the equivalent of a blank at the way capitalist cores are themselves protected 
from competition and the need for reform of the World Trade Organisation and IFIs 
(Millennium Project). In a less brutal way, perhaps, the revisionists of this decade 
may be replicating suppression by the Reagan administration in the 1980s of the 
South’s demands for a New International Economic Order that might foster 
alternatives to economic fundamentalism. Silence surrounds the role of 
interventionary core capitalism in perpetuating proverty through discriminatory 
policies that structure the global economy. 
 
Economics as Natural Law 
Second, the revisionism still takes economics as largely independent of politics and 
social values. It results, as Robert Cox has suggested, in the de-politicisation of 
economic issues (Cox, 1992), as if a natural law or a primordial economic equivalent 
of the sex drive, rather than powerful interests, were guiding economic activity. 
Consequently, there is only one solution to all inadequately developed societies, 
whether East Timor or Haiti, and it is a solution based in the economic rationalism of 
(capitalistic) entrepreneurship. The project is completely transparent in its notion that 
public monies, whether from revenues raised in developing countries or from aid 
derived from the public purse in the donor countries should be used to provide profit-
seeking business with a leg up. Unsurprisingly, the contradiction inherent in this so-
called ‘rationalism’ is not addressed by the revisionists, though it is of acute concern 
to societies in the process of transformation from war to peace. Notoriously, aid often 
privileges the purchase of donor goods and expertise rather than local products and 
employment. Privatisation has been pursued at the expense of public goods and public 
space – where public goods are defined as accessible to all, non-exclusive and whose 
value for one consumer does not diminish their value for others (Kaul, 2005). Values 
other than those of economic rationalism are neglected, including the freedom to 
decide how markets are conducted, even though they figure in the UN “Millennium 
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Declaration” and have been espoused by, among others, Armartya Sen (Sen, 1999). 
Inequalities and non-physiological needs are considered more significant than either 
absolute poverty or, beyond a survival point, physiological needs. This means that 
provided people are not destitute (which might be equated to the deep poverty scale of 
the UNDP), they may choose to live humbly in order to feel fulfilled. Such an 
approach recognises that the paths to modernisation may not be convergent at all, and 
the marginalised peoples of the world are entitled to choose the extent to which, and 
how, they integrate in the global economy.  
  
Objectifying War-Torn Societies 
Third, the discursive trope of imperial peacebuilding pathologises populations in war-
torn societies as if suffering from congenital incapacities that needs treatment through 
forms of therapeutic governance. In their critique of the psychosocial treatment of 
states as “failed service providers run amok,” Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac 
note that political processes divorced from the depiction of problems of conflict, 
oppression and poverty has opened the way for therapeutic approaches to intervention 
(Hughes and Pupavac, 2005: 2). Archived as congenitally incapable of governance 
and statehood, these societies require forms of trusteeship that inevitably reflect the 
priorities of the trustees.  
   
The Mantra of Global Economic Integration 
Fourth, the revisionists continue to regard development, at least rhetorically, as a 
matter of convergence and integration. Although the Sachs report does subscribe to 
fairer, if not fair, trade, it regards replication of an economic system, advanced in New 
York as the goal of development. Whether this is an ideal that pervades economic 
representations to give hope to the undeveloped, when in practice policy makers 
sometimes act as though there are parallel and even divergent economic 
development(s), or whether the convergence/replication programme is a matter of 
self-delusion, is less important than its role in reinforcing a particular model of 
sustainable development. Similarly, the fetish for integration and participation in 
global trade, manifest in the Balkan Commission’s Report, learns nothing from 
research on development by Kamal Malhotra’s team for the UNDP and from critical 
work on the political economy of peacebuilding (Malhotra, et al., 2003). Inverting the 
neoliberal/Sachsian mantra that integration produces trade and growth, the critical 
perspectives that map both historical and current transformations demonstrate that 
integration follows growth, which follows protectionist policies, much as the UK, 
United States and EU protected, and continue to protect vital economic interests while 
promoting freer trade. The vulnerable, it might be legitimately argued, need to be 
protected from the risks of integration.  
 
Squeezing Public Goods 
Fifth, a significant deficit in all strands of revisionism, however, concerns public 
goods. Recovery generation and poverty reduction is constructed as a matter requiring 
physical security, state building, therapeutic governance, private (therefore largely 
foreign) direct investment and welfare pluralism. In the economics of social policy, 
for example, “welfare pluralism” remains the order of the day. In addition to residual 
state supply and community/civil society provision for such basic services as health, 
education and water, market mechanisms and the private sector have been integral to 
development (World Bank, 2004). Indeed, economies have been opened up to 
liberalisation, public goods have been poor quality and budget deficits have deprived 
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governments of resources (Carbonnier, 2004; Hilary, 2005). Detailed analysis 
indicates, however, the absence of intrinsic benefits from the process: 
 
This welfare pluralism takes the clock back to an earlier historical era when 
social advances and capabilities enhancement proceeded at a much slower 
pace than during the decades of state-led welfare provision…. [yet] there is 
no reason to believe that developing countries should already embark on a 
path of extensive privatisation in social services, especially as large part of 
their populations are still not covered by the most basic education and health 
services. (Mehrotra and Delamonica, 2005: 141) 
 
Alternative Options 
 
Other straws in the wind, however, indicate a more substantial departure from the old 
liberal orthodoxy. The Department for International Development (DFID), for 
example, denies that aid should be placed at the service of global security, and the 
institution is itself committed to refocusing its work on governance to include more 
direct support for the security of the poor (DFID, 2005: 13, 24). This not only entails 
therapeutic governance to establish accountable political systems, combating crime 
and promoting transparency in the management of resources and public finance. It 
also proposes more emphasis on the provision of basic services such as health and 
education, security and justice. DFID even bawls into the silence surrounding the 
adverse impacts of structural adjustment, citing the role of the IMF in precipitating the 
crisis in former Yugoslavia (DFID, 2005: 9). Furthermore, the UK claimed to relax its 
aid conditionality in March 2005. Aid would continue to be linked to poverty 
reduction, human rights, military spending levels and misuse of aid, but would no 
longer be tied to global security goals. The UK would also cease demanding specific 
commitments from aid recipients to privatise state industries and liberalise trade, and 
would urge the World Bank and others to follow (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and DFID, 2005; Beattie and Daneshku, 2005). Whether the proposals are simply part 
of an internal debate and whether, if activated, they will carry weight in either UK or 
international politics might be doubted, however. The 2005 G8 summit in Scotland 
promised much, but – as indicated by the inclusion of debt relief in the aid figures and 
relief limited to repayment write-offs for 18 countries for only three years – claims for 
an historic deal for Africa reflected the interests of donors under pressure than the 
Africans seeking justice (Monbiot, 2005). DFID itself has spent huge sums on 
consultancy firms to advise on privatisation in developing countries, firms whose own 
analytical frameworks reflect the privileging of investor interests. For example, the, 
pro-privatisation Adam Smith Institute (International) received over £34 million from 
the UK aid budget in 1998–2003, and £700,000 of £3m British aid to Malawi was 
spent on US consultants (War on Want, 2004; Hilary, 2005; Hencke, 2005).  
Others have challenged some of the tenets of the liberal peace in a more 
fundamental way. James Boyce, for example, not only calls for substantial 
abandonment of conditionality, but also for reform of the aid donation system and for 
support to state economic direction. While rampant inflation can lead to social unrest, 
so can vicious austerity, and thus the current priorities may be ill-suited to societies 
emerging from conflict (Boyce, 2002). Similarly, Simon Maxwell suggests that social 
protection should be a high priority and pro-poor growth needs to be complemented 
by distributive measures. Although Maxwell assumes a common destination for 
developing countries, pursued at different speeds, he contends that they should not be 
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suddenly exposed to liberalisation without safety netting for vulnerable sectors. 
Furthermore, international “governance reform” should be a precondition of more 
money going through the World Bank (Maxwell, 2005: 5-6).  
Another macro-level approach would be to draw upon the traditions of 
protectionism. Even on their own, statist terms, proponents of the liberal peace tend to 
overlook plenty of examples of protectionism and dirigisme, that nursed vulnerable 
societies through difficult times: France, Sweden, Cuba, Asian states (including 
Vietnam which recovered from war quicker than Cambodia). To soften the impact of 
integration pressures in southeast Europe, for example, the development of a regional 
customs union has been suggested (Horvat, 1999: 136-149, 170-171). As with the 
original European Payment Union and the European Community after the second 
world war, this would concede that mutual protection to replace national protection is 
a reasonable starting point, rather than aiming to engineer integration on the basis of 
complete free trade. A regional payments and customs union would work towards 
abolition of import duties between the members but maintain common tariffs, though 
gradually lowered, against selected imports for a period of, say, 10-15 years. 
Investment in public goods, infrastructure, social welfare systems and public 
employment may be necessary to help redress a situation in which a few individuals 
flaunt obscene affluence but public facilities are often squalid. Such dirigisme may 
entail controls and a degree of political authoritarianism every bit as irksome as that 
employed by international civil administrations in post-conflict societies. But a strong 
and active state role in planning and implementation (Ballentine and Sherman, 2003) 
with expansionist policies to increase employment, income generation and 
consumption power to wean vulnerable people off illegal activities through 
investment in public services and social protection, may be less dysfunctional than the 
orthodox neoliberal model. Specifically, the statist measures might include: 
 
• production generated by import controls and protection of critical sectors, especially 
agriculture; 
• high taxes on luxury items and rationing or subsidies for basic foodstuffs; 
• government intervention to boost re-training, employment and public services; 
• maintenance of public sector salaries; 
• increased purchasing power through public works;  
• deficit financing; 
• controls on donor corruption; 
• reduction in tied aid. 
 
On the other hand, the emphasis on state building in the liberal peace project has 
only lately paid attention to the political economy of grass-roots levels. In particular 
collective and cooperative production and marketing, whether part of the formal or 
informal economy, are often viable mechanisms for economic organisation. This is 
not invariably the case. Many African co-ops are not so much member-owned, as 
financed by, and accountable to, governments, which have used them as channels for 
implementing economic policy (International Co-operative Information Centre, 
1994). However, independent, self-help co-operatives have been important in war-
torn societies where central economic authority has been weak. They have been 
especially important to women (from Rwanda to Bosnia), for whom they have been 
vehicles of empowerment as well as economic survival. Similarly, credit unions have 
emancipated people from centralised banking and insurance companies. For people 
who have limited access to towns, who are penalised by traditional bank profiling and 
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charges – or who need to receive remittances from diasporas abroad – credit unions 
serve various needs. Over £2 billion is estimated to be sent from Britain to other 
countries in this way, and other estimates indicate that over US$200 billion is 
transmitted globally through such informal channels. Credit unions number 40,000 
worldwide (the largest number in the United States) with an aggregate membership of 
over 136 million. The world coordinating body, with support from USAID, opened 
two unions in Afghanistan, which in the first two years attracted 2,000 members 
(World Council of Credit Unions, 2004a; 2004b.)  Both co-ops and credit unions 
appear to have alliances and linkages with aid organisations and are given credence in 
the UN system, especially in the International Labour Organisation and the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation.  
 
Conclusion: Who is Peacebuilding For? 
  
In conclusion, there have certainly been notable shifts in the development and 
peacebuilding debates. There is now a potential institutional merger of the two 
through UN reform. The liberal peace has come under sustained pressure as a 
consequence of critiques and failures in practice. Pragmatic shifts, to some extent 
towards pro-poor and emancipatory engagement with local populations, have 
occurred.   
But we are still entitled to ask the critical question: who is peacebuilding for, 
and what purposes does it serve? The means for achieving the good life are 
constructions that emerge from the discourse and policy frameworks dominated by 
specific capitalist interests – represented as shared, inevitable, commonsensical or the 
only available option – when they correspond to the prevailing mode of ownership. 
Economic wisdom resides with the powerful. As Murphy notes, political inequality 
leaves many with no control over the major decisions that affect their lives (Murphy, 
2005: 18). For Cox, too, “whereas the right of self-assertion is celebrated, in a social 
and economic context the individual’s capacity to exert control over the systemic 
factors that determine its implementation is removed. Consequently, just as in one-
party, authoritarian regimes, politics is about depoliticizing people, by removing the 
economic determinants of everyday conditions from political control” (Cox, 1992).  
The millennial revisionism represents a significant shift. But ultimately it may 
perpetuate asymmetries that maintain the liberal peace, albeit in less orthodox forms. 
Indeed, the revisionism may intensify the grip of capitalist-dominated financial and 
trade institutions. The recommendations of the 2004 UN High Level Panel’s report on 
boosting the UN’s attention to peacebuilding activities includes provision for 
international financial institutions to be more actively involved in peace processes. 
However, without transformation of the IFIs, and the liberal agenda itself, subjugation 
rather than emancipation will continue to be injected into the political economy of 
peacebuilding.  
 
Note 
1. Global governance has been defined as: “a world-wide management strata sharing 
neoliberal ideology, a growing network of both public and private regimes that 
extends across the world’s largest regions, the system of global intergovernmental; 
organizations, some of which are relatively autonomous and powerful, and 
transnational organizations both carrying out some of the traditional service functions 
of global public agencies and also working to create regimes and new systems of 
international integration.” (Murphy, 2005: 139).   
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